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INSURANCE
WESLEY M. WALKER*
The cases reviewed during this survey year do not contain
any great departures from the established rules and decisions.
While one might contend the Watts1 decision to be a depar-
ture from the prior decision of Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Com-
pany,2 it is squarely in line with Massey v. War Emergency
Co-op Assn.," and is a sound, well-reasoned decision. A unique
case, factually speaking, is that of St. Paul Mercury Indem-
nity Company v. Palmetto Quarries Company.4 The Supreme
Court also considered three cases5 dealing with the defense of
the insured's alleged failure to cooperate. Because of the va-
riety of the subject matter of the decisions, classification was
difficult.
Procedure
The following cases are not related except insofar as each
pertains to a procedural question involved in insurance liti-
gation.
United States Casualty Company v. Hiers, et al.6 involved an
action by the insurer against its agents for the amount of a
judgment and costs which had previously been rendered
against the insurer in an action on the policy by the insured.
This case involved two procedural questions, one being a judg-
ment rendered upon the pleadings and the other dealing with
vouching.
*Member of the firm of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Green-
ville; A.B., 1936, University of South Carolina; LL.B., 1938, University
of South Carolina; Attorney, City of Greenville, 1949-51; member Green-
ville County, South Carolina and American Bar Associations.
1 Watts v. Baker, et al., 233 S. C. 446, 105 S. E. 2d 605 (1958).
2. 202 S. C. 456, 25 S. E. 2d 489 (1943).
3. 209 S. C. 292; 39 S. E. 2d 907 (1946).
4. 234 S. C. 246, 107 S. E. 2d 453 (1959).
5. Tucker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 232 S. C. 615,
103 S. E. 2d 272 (1958); Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Liab.
Ins Co. 233 S. C. 376, 104 S. E. 2d 673 (1958) ; Pharr v. Canal Ins. Co.,
23Y S. Z. 266, 104 S. E. 2d 394 (1958).
6. 233 S. C. 333, 104 S. E. 2d 561 (1958).
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The Complaint alleged the facts which were found in the
prior action of the insured,7 one Taylor, against the insurer,
and reference should be made to this decision for more com-
plete details with regard to the factual situation giving rise
to the litigation. Briefly, Taylor had instituted an action
against the insurance company for the wrongful cancellation
of his automobile liability policy. Cancellation was the result
of the failure of the insurance agent, Hiers, to return the pre-
mium to Taylor. The insurance company cancelled the policy
and returned the insurance premium to Hiers, who retained
the same in his possession. The insurance company now
brings this action to recover over against Hiers, and the lower
court held that in view of the fact that it was practically con-
ceded by Hiers that he was the agent of the insurance com-
pany and that he had negligently retained the premiums
which should have been forwarded to Taylor, that Hiers' an-
swer was sham. Judgment was accordingly entered upon the
pleadings under the well-settled general rule that the failure
of an agent of an insurer to comply with the instructions of
the latter, whereby loss to it results, is liable over to the in-
surer.
It appears from the report of this case that the insurance
company had written a letter through its attorneys to Hiers
advising of the pendency of motions in the Taylor case for
judgment n. o. v. and for a new trial. This letter contained a
notice that the insurer would look to the agent for payment
of the judgment and reimbursement of expenses if the judg-
ment be entered against the insurer, and the agents were in-
vited to have their counsel assist in the argument of the mo-
tions. A second letter advised the agent of the adverse ruling
upon the motions and repeating the insurer's position that the
ultimate liability would be placed upon the agent. The letter
also advised that notice of an appeal had been filed and asked
for the agent's "reaction" as to perfecting the appeal and in-
quiring as to what the agent would like to have done in regard
to it. These letters were ignored by the agent. The Supreme
Court held that it was the duty of the agent to voice at that
time their opposition to the appeal, if they were opposed, and
that under the circumstances their silence amounted to acqui-
escence. The agent contended that they had not been vouched
7. Taylor v. United States Casualty Co., 229 S. C. 230, 92 S. E. 2d
647 (1956).
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to defend the Taylor action, but the Supreme Court held that
there was no duty upon the insurer to formally vouch the
agent. The Court stated that the agent had full knowledge of
the pendency of it, were consulted with reference to the de-
fense, and that Hiers had testified for the insurer who was the
defendant in the Taylor case. The Supreme Court said that in
none of the many authorities reviewed did it appear that the
practice of vouching was followed, much less required, in or-
der to fix liability upon the misfeasant agent.
The case of Watts v. Baker, et al.8 is the latest of a host of
cases relating to the proper joinder of an insurance company
with the insured as a party defendant in an action by the in-
jured party for damages. The plaintiff was a passenger in a
taxi-cab and brought an action against the owner of the taxi-
cab and his insurer for injuries sustained in the accident. The
defendants had previously filed a motion to make the com-
plaint more definite and certain by requiring the plaintiff to
allege whether or not the insurance policy referred to in the
complaint was filed pursuant to the requirements of any sta-
tute or ordinance and by setting forth in detail the citation
and reference to any such statute or ordinance. The lower
court had granted this motion and the plaintiff had complied
with the lower court's order by serving an amended com-
plaint setting forth the Columbia ordinance relating to taxi-
cabs. To this amended complaint the defendants demurred on
the grounds that the amended complaint did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the insurer
in that it appeared on the face of the complaint that the plain-
tiff was suing the insurance company upon a liability policy
issued to the insured and that no cause of action existed un-
der such policy until a final judgment was recovered against
the insurer. It was further contended by the demurrer that
since it did not appear on the face of the complaint that the
plaintiff had recovered a final judgment against the insured,
that there was a misjoinder of causes of action in the com-
plaint. The lower court overruled the demurrer and defend-
ants appealed from this ruling.
The Columbia City Ordinance is set forth in the opinion,
a pertinent portion of which is as follows:
8. 233 S. C. 446, 105 S. E. 2d 605 -(1968).
[Vol. 12
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"... . the bond or policy shal- stipulate that any person
who may recover final judgment for damages, such judg-
ment remaining unpaid thirty days, shall have the right
of action on such bond or policy in the event the owner
of the taxicab is insolvent and does not pay the same with-
in thirty days."
The Supreme Court stated that it had held in numerous
cases that where insurance was given as required in Section
58-1481 of the 1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina, that it
was proper, pursuant to Section 10-702 of the Code, to join
the insured and the insurance company as parties defendant
in an action by a third person based upon the negligence of
the insured.
The Court stated that it should be noted that Section 58-
1481 requires the filing with the Public Service Commission
of liability and property damage "insuring or indemnifying"
passengers receiving personal injuries from any act of negli-
gence. Under this statutory requirement the Court stated that
it had held that the policies filed are liability rather than in-
demnity policies and that an injured party has a direct right
of action thereon. The Court stated that the words "insur-
ing or indemnifying" present in the statute and in many of the
city ordinances, formed the basis on which most of the cases
decided by the Court on the joinder question have turned. It
was noted that these words were absent from the Columbia
Staxi-cab ordinance. In view of the absence of such words the
Supreme Court concluded that the ordinance of the City of
Columbia gave to the injured party a cause of action on the
insurance policy filed with the city only in the event of a re-
covery of a final judgment againt the taxi-cab owner; his in-
solvency; and his failure to pay the judgment within thirty
days. It was held that the injured party had no cause of ac-
tion against the insurer until these conditions had been met
and that the insurer had no obligation directly to the public
until after final judgment against the taxi-cab owner and
operator had been obtained. Accordingly, the insurer was held
not to be 'properly joined as a-party defendant in the action
and the case was remanded to the lower court for the purpose
of an Order sustaining the demurrer, thereby elemininating
from the case the insurer and all references in the complaint
to insurance coverage. -
4
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The case of South Carolina Electric and Gas Company v.
Aetna Insurance Company9 involved primarily the question as
to whether or not South Carolina procedure permitted a trial
judge to grant a new trial upon the issues of damages only.
The trial resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiffs for
$138,000.00. The usual defensive motions were overruled, ex-
cept the trial judge granted a new trial upon the issue of dam-
ages only. He found the verdict to be excessive but declined
to reduce it by order for new trial nisi, which course was
within his discretion.
The first question upon appeal concerned itself with
whether or not under the evidence the loss may have been
reasonably found to be within the terms of the subject policy.
The Court concluded that this was a jury issue.
, The second question was whether the insured had proven
any recoverable damages. The Court overruled the insurer's
objection stating that the evidence as to the amount of the
loss was not so deficient as to warrant a directed verdict be-
cause of the failure of proof in tha# respect.
Finally, with regard to the procedural question at issue,
which was the main point in the appeal, the Court held that
the trial judge had committed reversible error in granting a
new trial limited to the issue of damages. The Court recog-
nized that this practice was followed in the Federal Courts
under rule 59 (a), but stated that modern decisions of our
Court did not countenance such procedure, and that in the ab-
sence of an authorizing statute or rule, the Court did not feel
warranted in making such an important innovation in our
procedure.
Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded.
In the case of St. Paul Mercury & Indemnity Company v.
Palmetto Quarries Company,10 the insurance company had
filed with the Industrial Commission an "A" card indicating
Palmetto Quarries to have Workmen's Compensation cover-
age. Under the Compensation Act quarries were not a type of
business which came within the mandatory provisions of the
Act. The action was brought by the insurance company to re-
cover premiums due by the insured and the insured admitted
this indebtedness and interposed two counterclaims, one in
tort and one in contract. The counterclaim based on contract
9. 233 S. C. 557, 106 S. E. 2d 276 (1958).
10. 234 S. C. 246, 107 S. E. 2d 453 (1959).
[Vol. 12
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was subsequently abandoned and the counterclaim based in
tort was the real issue before the Court. This counterclaim
was based upon the following factual situation: An employee
of Palmetto Quarries, one Garvin, sustained an injury while
at work and through his attorney filed a claim with the South
Carolina Industrial Commission for compensation. Palmetto
Quarries did not want the case handled as a Workmen's Com-
pensation case because it was afraid the Industrial Commis-
sion might impose penalties upon it for failing to comply with
the law. The insurance company refused to pay the amount
demanded by Garvin to settle his claim but offered to the
quarry to defend the claim before the Industrial Commission
on the grounds that the quarry was exempt from the manda-
tory coverage of the law. The insurance company further of-
fered to pay any judgment that might result against the
quarry from this claim if it should be found that the filing of
the "A" card has extended the coverage to include industrial
claims. Palmetto Quarries, however, refused to permit the in-
surance company to oppose the employee's claim and ultimately
entered into an agreement with the claimant's attorney where-
by the claim was withdrawn and a common law action, based
on the employee's injuries, was brought against the quarry and
as a part of the agreement it was agreed to settle the common
law action for the consideration of $3,500.00. This was done
and Palmetto Quarries counterclaimed to have the insurance
company contribute to the settlement. The insurance company
had originally declined to contribute and stood on its offer to
oppose the claim before the Industrial Commission or to de-
fend against the subsequent common law action and to pay
any judgment resulting therefrom.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Judge who di-
rected that Palmetto Quarries pay to the insurance company
the premiums due and dismissed the counterclaims. The Su-
preme Court stated that while it might be conceded that the
actions of the insurer led the Industrial Commission to take
the position that Palmetto Quarries had elected to come under
the Workmen's Compensation Act and had caused the employ-
ee, Garvin, to seek Workmen's Compensation rather than to
bring a common law action. The Court stated, however, that
it would be difficult to see how this could have caused any loss
to the quarry in view of the willingness of the insurance com-
pany to pay any recovery by the employee resulting from the
1959]
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mistakes of the insurer, which had offered to pay any award
that might be rendered by the Industrial Commission or to
pay any judgment that might result from the common law
action.
Primary and Secondary, or Excess, Coverage
In American Surety Company of New York v. Canal Insur-
ance Company," the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the United States District Court decision. The question in-
volved which of two insurers had the primary coverage, or
whether the insurance coverage should be pro-rated. Johnson
Motor Lines had leased a truck from Mary B. Southerland,
d/b/a S & S Produce Company, for a trip from Greenville to
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In route it was in a collision in
Virginia, and thereafter suits for personal injury and prop-
erty damage were filed against Johnson Motor Lines in North
Carolina. American Surety Company of New York was the in-
surer for Johnson Motor Lines and Canal Insurance Company
was the insurer for S & S Produce Company. Canal was called
upon under its omnibus clause to defend these actions in
North Carolina and to pay any judgment which might be ob-
tained against Johnson Motor Lines, up to the limits of its
coverage, but Canal refused to do so. American Surety there-
upon defended the actions and satisfied the judgments after
they were entered. American Surety then filed this suit in the
District Court for the Western District of South Carolina by
which it seeks reimbursement from Canal of so much of its
payment in satisfaction of the judgments as was within the
limits of Canal's coverages, plus its attorney's fees, costs and
expenses incurred in the defense of the North Carolina tort
actions.
The District Court concluded that the two coverages were
concurrent and that the loss should be pro-rated between the
carriers.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, speaking through
Judge Haynsworth, concluded that the insurer of the owner of
a described vehicle has the-first and primary obligation. Hav-
ing thus concluded, the Court then held that a non-ownership
clause, such as was contained in American Surety's policy,
with regard to the use of a hired vehicle, with an excess cover-
11. 258 F. 2d 934 (4Oh Cir. 1958).
[Vol. 12
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age provision, does not constitute other valid and collectible
insurance, within the meaning of a primary policy with an
omnibus clause. Canal's policy limits its liability to a propor-
tion of the loss, based upon the relation of the policy limits,
if there was other valid and collectible insurance available
to the insured. Accordingly, it was held that the Ameri-
can Surety policy did not constitute other valid and collectible
insurance insofar as the Canal policy was concerned and
Canal was held to be the primary insurer and directed to re-
imburse American Surety up to the limits of its policy, for the
judgments rendered in tort actions and for all costs, expenses
and attorney's fees.
Interest of The Public In Insurance Matters
In Batchelor v. American Health Insurance Company2 the
appellant purchased a hospital expense policy from the re-
spondent insurance company and instituted this action to re-
cover the benefits allegedly due under the policy. The insur-
ance company defended primarily upon the grounds that the
appellent had obtained numerous other policies of hospital
insurance which, together, would provide benefits in an
amount greatly in excess of his earnings and it was thereby
contended that the obtaining of the instant policy and the
other policies constituted a wagering contract and was con-
trary to public policy. The testimony showed that the appel-
lant had a gross weekly income of some $65.00 and that under
the varous policies by which he was insured, some ten in num-
ber, he would be entitled to approximately $745.00 per week
plus additional benefits for certain medical and hospital
charges for each week he was hospitalized.
Our Court stated that a wager policy of insurance is a pre-
tended insurance, where the insured has no interest in the
thing insured and can sustain no loss by the happening of the
misfortunes insured against. The Court stated that a wager
policy had also been defined as one made when the insured
had no insurable interest. In the subject case the Court stated
that the appellant had an insurable interest in his own health
and he could sustain a loss by the happening of the event
against which the respondent had issued its policy of insur-
ance. The Court accordingly held that the policy did not con-
stitute a wagering contract.
12. 234 S. C. 103, 107 S. E. 2d 36 (1959).
1959]
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With regard to the public policy, the Court has the follow-
ing to say:
There is no established public policy which prevents one
from purchasing as many hospital expense policies as one
may desire. This is so because there is no prohibitory sta-
tute, and there are no judicial decisions establishing a
public policy which prevents such.
... Thus, in the absence of policy restrictions, the rule
is that a person having insurable interest may insure such
interest in whatever amount and in as many companies
as he desires.
In State v. National Postal Transport Association,'3 our Su-
preme Court held that a foreign insurance company was not
liable for the statutory penalty of $10.00 per day imposed by
§ 12-737 of the 1952 Code of Laws for South Carolina.
The Court held that the provisions of the Code dealing with
the domestication of foreign corporations did not pertain to
foreign insurance companies who do business within this state
and that the legislature had placed the supervision of foreign
insurance companies in the hands of the insurance commis-
sioner.
Requirements for Cooperation by the Insured
Edward Tucker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company14 involved an appeal from the direction of ver-
dict in favor of the insurer because of breach by the insured
of the assistance and cooperation provision of an automobile
liability policy. The insured had refused to sign the verifica-
tion of an answer prepared for him by an attorney engaged
by the insurer saying that he did not want to have anything
more to do with the action for damages against him. Also, in-
sured failed to respond to notices and letters sent to him by
insurer's attorney and subsequently, judgment by default was
taken which constituted the basis of the action here. The Su-
preme Court held that consideration of all the evidence re-
quired the conclusion that the only reasonable inference was
that insured completely failed to comply with his obligations
under the pertinent provision of the policy, whereby insurer
was released from liability. In this decision the Court did not
13. 234 S. C. 260, 107 S. E. 2d 763 (1959).
14. 232 S. C. 615, 103 S. E. 2d 272 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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reach the point of whether failure of cooperation of insured
must be prejudicial to the rights of the insurer in order to
release it from liability, but said there could be no doubt of
existence of prejudice under the facts of this case.
In Pharr v. Canal Insurance Company'5 certain parties,
who had been injured in an automobile accident and had re-
covered judgments against the insured driver, brought suit
directly against insurer to the extent of the policy limits. In
the Circuit Court verdicts were directed in favor of the plain-
tiffs which were reversed on appeal as the Supreme Court held
that questions of cooperation by insured with insurer in de-
fense of suits and whether such failure to cooperate had re-
sulted in substantial prejudice of insurer were for jury.
The insurer had obtained a declaratory judgment against
insured on the basis of failure to cooperate but the Court con-
cluded this was not res adjudicata as to injured plaintiffs
who were not parties to the declaratory action. Furthermore,
the insurance contract between two parties for the benefit of
a third could be enforced by such third party beneficiary even
though he was not named therein.
Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Liability Insur-
ance Company'6 was an action brought by a personal injury
judgment creditor and his assignee against an insurer under
an automobile liability policy. The insurer denied liability on
the grounds that the insured had failed to comply with the
terms of the policy in that proper notice of the accident had
not been given to the company and that the insured had failed
to fulfill the requirements of the cooperation clause.
The Court sustained the trial judge's refusal to hold as a
matter of law that the insured did not cooperate as required
by the policy where the evidence showed that the insured no-
tified the insurer's attorney two days before the trial that he
could not remember the details of the accident even though
he gave a prior detailed statement concerning such details.
The question of whether the insured was wilfully trying to
help the plaintiff recover against the insurer or whether he
was suffering from traumatic amnesia in this instance was
properly for the jury. The Court restated its position that:
Ordinarily, therefore, whether or not an insured has per-
formed his duty in each case will present perplexing
15. 233 S. C. 266, 104 S. E. 2d 394 (1958).
16. 233 S. 0. 376, 104 S. E. 2d 673 (1958).
1959]
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problems of fact, properly for a jury to determine .... If
there is any contradictory testimony thereabout, it must
be submitted to a jury.
The Court further held that there was no error in allowing
proof of the insurer's waiver of the policy requirement of
written notice of accident where a membership identification
card provided for the giving of oral notice, even though the
complaint did not allege waiver.
It is interesting to note that not one of the three cases cited
in this section resolved the effect of subsection (3) of Section
46-750.26 of the South Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety Respon-
sibility Act, that:
No statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no
violation of the policy shall defeat or avoid the policy;
The Pharr v. Canal Insurance Company issue arose before
the enactment of the statute, and neither the Tucker case nor
the Brown decision raised this point.
Waiver and Estoppel
In American Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Green
17
the insurer brought an action against the insured to foreclose
two mortgages executed by the insured and subsequently as-
signed to the insurer. The insured by way of counterclaim
sought judgment against the insurer on his fire policy. The
insurer denied liability upon the grounds that (1) the build-
ing had been "unoccupied beyond a period of sixty consecutive
days" prior to the loss, and (2) that the insured had failed
to furnish written proof of loss within sixty days after the
fire as required by the policy.
The Court, affirming the judgment for the insured, held
that the insurer waived the requirement of the policy requir-
ing proof of loss when liability was denied on grounds not
related to the proof of loss. The conduct of the adjuster
in telling the insured during the investigation not to remove
any of the salvage and that the insured would hear from the
company was held tantamount to waiver and estoppel. The
argument by the company that the non-waiver agreement exe-
cuted by the insured averted the operation of waiver and es-
toppel was overruled on the grounds that the wording of the
non-waiver agreement related to the investigation of the loss
and the insured claimed waiver and estoppel by the conduct
17. 233 S. C. 588, 106 S. E. 2d 265 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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of the company prior to the execution of the agreement and
after the investigation was completed rather than during the
investigation. The Court stated:
These agreements are always construed strictly against
the insurer and will not be extended so as to prevent a
waiver by acts not within their terms.
Special Provisions
In Deloache v. Carolina Life Insurance Company 18 an ac-
tion was brought against the insurer to recover under the
double indemnity provision of a life policy.
The Court held unanimously that where the double indem-
nity provision provided that no such additional amount would
be paid in the event of death resulting from injuries inten-
tionally inflicted by another person, that the insurer would not
be liable when the insured was shot following an exchange of
words with another person, regardless of whether that person
was mentally or legally responsible.
Products Liability
In Ducker v. Central Surety and Insurance Corporation1 9
an action was brought by the insured on a products liability
policy to recover the amount of a judgment obtained against
the insured by a customer for damages resulting from an ex-
ploding furnace installed by the insured in the customer's
home. The policy provided for payment of "all sums which the
insured should become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of injury to or destruction of property caused by acci-
dent and arising out of goods or products manufactured, sold,
handled, or distributed to others by the insured .... " The
defendant refused to pay the loss because it contended that
it was not a loss resulting from accident. At the conclusion of
plaintiff's evidence, the trial court granted the defendant's
motion for nonsuit upon the conclusion that an accident, with-
in the terms of the policy, had not been established.
Chief Justice Stukes, delivering the unanimous decision of
the Court to reverse the trial Court and grant a new trial,
held that where evidence indicated that the furnace repeat-
edly accumlated soot and gas which resulted in explosions
18. 233 S. C. 34, 104 S. E. 2d 875 (1958).
19. 234 S. C. 228, 107 S. E. 2d 342 (1959).
1959]
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that smoked the walls of the house and where it was shown
that one of the explosions dislodged the smokestack, that the
question of whether the damage was caused by accident with-
in the terms of the policy was for the jury.
Fraud and Insurance Conracts
During the survey year, the South Carolina Supreme Court
resolved two insurance cases involving issues of fraud, while
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit resolved only one case involving such issues.
In Blackmon v. United Insurance Company20 the Court
held that the trial judge properly refused the defendant's mo-
tion to strike the allegations of plaintiff's complaint seeking
punitive damages for alleged fraudulent respresentations by
the insurer's agent in obtaining a life insurance policy and
premium receipt book from the beneficiary under the policy.
The Court pointed out that while breach of contract, how-
ever fraudulent the intent accompanying it, does not of itself
give rise to a cause of action for punitive damages, that where
the fraudulent intent is accompanied by a fraudulent act, lia-
bility will arise for punitive as well as actual damages. The
trial Court properly construed the cause of action in this in-
stance as one for fraudulent breach of contract accompanied
by a fraudulent act. The Supreme Court went further to point
out that refusal of the defendant's motion to strike such alle-
gations as irrelevant was not appealable, citing Sparks v.
D. M. Dew & Sons, Inc.2 1 and Winchester v. United Insurance
Company22 .
The case of Ward v. Liberty Life Insurance Company2= in-
volved an action for damages for fraudulent breach of an al-
leged undertaking by the defendants to procure and put in
force a policy of insurance on the life of plaintiff's intestate.
Plaintiff alleged that application for a "decreasing term"
policy was made to the defendant on May 19, 1955 naming
the mortgagee of the plaintiff's intestate as beneficiary. The
policy was prepared under date of July 1 and forwarded to
the agent. It is noteworthy that the policy contained a pro-
vision that it would not take effect until the first premium
was paid and that such premium was never paid. Plaintiff's
20. 233 S. Q. 424, 105 S. E. 2d 521 (1958).
21. 230 S. C. 507, 96 S. E. 2d 488 (1957).
22. 231 S. C. 288, 98 S. E. 2d 530 (1957).
23. 232 S. C. 582, 103 S. E. 2d 48 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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intestate died August 1, 1955 with the policy still in the hands
of the agent. Thereafter suit was brought by the administra-
trix alleging that the fraudulent acts consisted of: (1) the
failure by the agent to notify the insured that the policy had
been written and was in his possession; and (2) in not paying
the initial premium either from the escrow account or out of
the funds of the savings and loan association. The Supreme
Court affirmed the order of nonsuit entered by the lower court
on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that the insurer was guilty of such unreasonable delay in ef-
fecting delivery of the policy as to estop the insurer to deny
that the policy was in force and that the evidence was also in-
sufficient to establish that the insurer or the agent was guilty
of fraud in failing to deliver the policy to the intestate or to
notify him of the premium due. The Court pointed out that,
while such circumstances did not appear here, that in a prop-
er case that:
Unreasonable delay by the insurer's agent in effecting
delivery of the policy just as such delay on the part of the
insurer in acting upon an application, may, if accom-
panied by circumstances such as retention of the pre-
mium, misleading representation relied upon the appli-
cant, and the like, estop the insurer to deny that the
policy is in force.
The case of Nationwide Life Insurance Company v. Atta-
way2 4 involved an action brought by the beneficiaries on a life
policy against the defendant insurer who contended that the
beneficiaries were entitled only to a return of the insured's
premium because of certain false statements made in the ap-
plication for the policy concerning the prior medical history
of the insured. The examining physician was also the personal
physician of the insured and was alleged to have made the
false statements as to the insured's prior medical history on
his application with the knowledge that he had treated the in-
sured for extensive illnesses in the past. The physician had
not acted as agent of the company prior to the application for
the policy in question and therefore was not the company's
agent at the time of his prior examinations and treatment of
the insured.
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower Court in favor
24. 254 F. 2d 30 (4th Cir. 1958).
1959]
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of the defendant. The Court recited the prevailing rule in
South Carolina to the effect that:
If an insurance company issued a life policy with know-
ledge that the insured has misrepresented his physical
condition and is in fact not in good health, the company is
deemed to have waived the right to object and is bound
by its contract; and in such case the knowledge of an
agent of the company, who is aware of the misrepresen-
tation, is imputed to it, unless it is shown that the agent
as well as the insured was guilty of fraud. The agent's
knowledge, however, is not imputed to the company un-
less it was acquired during the period of his agency, or if
previously acquired, unless the agent had the information
in mind when he undertook to act for the company in the
issuance of the policy.
The Court further pointed out that the conclusion woud be
the same in this instance whether the physician had the facts
in mind and became a party to the fraud or did not have them
in mind when he approved the risk, for in either case under
the rule cited, the company would not be charged with know-
ledge of the truth and could not be held to have waived the
right to deny liability.
No Liability of Insurer to Owner Under Operator's Policy
In Booth v. American Casualty Company,25 an action was
brought by a liability insurer against the insured's adminis-
tratrix and another motorist involved in a collision for a de-
claratory judgment that the insurer was not liable on an op-
erator's or nonowner's policy where the insured owned the
automobile he was driving at the time of the collision. The
facts indicated that the vehicle had been purchased and regis-
tered in the name of the insured's sister.
The plaintiff sought to invoke the provisions of the South
Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act alleging its
design was to protect the motoring public and to effectuate
coverage, notwithstanding the specific language of the policy
to the contrary. The Court affirmed the lower court's judg-
ment for the insurer and restated its position that:
We cannot read into the insurance contract, under the
guise of public policy, provisions which are not required
25. 261 F. 2d 389 (4th Cir. 1958).
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by law and which the parties thereto clearly and plainly
have failed to include.
The Court pointed out that subsection (3) of Section 46-
750.26 of the Act came nearer to imposing liability on the in-
surance company than any other section. This subsection is
as follows:
"No statement made by the insured or on his behalf and
no violation of the policy shall defeat or avoid the policy ;"
The Court held that all the subsections of Section 46-750.26
refer to "the policy" as issued, however, and that there was
nothing in that section or any other section of the Act suf-
ficient to make an entirely new and different contract or to
substitute an owner's policy for an operator's policy.
Group Policies
The case of Waltz v. Equitable Life Assurance Society26
involved an action brought by a beneficiary under a group ac-
cidental death policy. The policy in question contained a
provision that coverage would automatically cease on termi-
nation of employment. On December 22, 1955, the insured was
arrested and charged with misappropriating his employer's
money. On December 29, 1955, the insured died.
The Court affirmed the lower Court's decision that the
testimony conclusively showed that the insured's employment
was terminated at the time of his arrest. The employee's own
act was held to have brought about the termination of his
employment.
26. 288 S. C. 210, 104 S. E. 2d 384 (1958).
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